I’ve just dropped a new YouTube video that lays out what I believe is one of the biggest opportunities most people completely overlook: Buying existing businesses instead of starting from scratch. Millions of business owners are reaching retirement with: – No succession plan – No family buyers – No internal management buyout – No interest from private equity So good, profitable businesses are being shut down every day simply because there’s no one to take them over. In the video I walk through: • Why this creates a massive acquisition opportunity • How I personally shifted from building to buying • The role mentors played in my first deals • Why positioning and credibility matter more than money early on This is the foundation of everything we talk about in this community:thinking like owners, investors and dealmakers — not just operators. Watch the video, then drop in the comments:What part of the acquisition journey are you most curious about right now — finding deals, financing, structuring, or approaching sellers?

New year, new intentions — and ideally, new acquisitions. Before things get busy again, I’d love everyone to take a moment to share what 2026 looks like for you from an M&A perspective. Comment, feel free to talk about things like: - Whether you’re looking to acquire this year (or just preparing to) - The sectors or types of businesses you’re most interested in - What part of the M&A process you want to get significantly better at in 2026 - If raising capital is part of your plan - And, at a high level, what you’re willing to commit in terms of time and/or capital to make it happen No pressure to be overly polished, this is about clarity, not perfection. The more openly you share, the more value you’ll get from the conversations, insights, and connections inside the community. Looking forward to reading everyone’s goals. Let’s make 2026 a year of serious progress and closed deals 🚀

We are raising capital from private investors - 100% secured against assets with 10% annual return for an existing growing business . Min investment size AUD-$100k. DM me if you are interested to invest and would like more information.

Hello everyone, I would appreciate your insights on a specific point in my current negotiations. I am in the process of acquiring a distribution business in the mountain sports sector, which has predictably high seasonality. The planned handover date is in March, which marks the beginning of the off-season. My key concern is determining the appropriate amount of cash (or net working capital) that should remain in the business at closing to ensure smooth operations through the low season until revenues pick up again. I want to do something simple, so my initial thought was to simply use the historical monthly bank balance as a proxy to identify the annual low point in the cash cycle. Or should I only consider the working capital requirement, eventually just calculated on the off season? It might trigger a price adjustment and I was trying to avoid that, but maybe there s no way around.... Has anyone dealt with a similar situation in acquiring a seasonal business? What methodologies or benchmarks did you find effective in defining the right "cash on hand" requirement? Thank you in advance for your input. Best regards,Philippe

When Asda was acquired in 2021, the transaction was heralded as one of the largest leveraged buyouts in UK history — and the largest retail LBO ever completed in the UK at the time.The enterprise value was approximately £6.8bn, with circa £4bn of debt pushed onto the balance sheet following the acquisition. At first glance, the deal appeared sensible: a high revenue, defensive grocery business with strong historic profitability and scale advantages.However, just a few years later, Asda has become a cautionary case study for deal makers on how leverage, rising interest rates, and unavoidable capex can destroy strategic flexibility.Under Walmart ownership, Asda was not distressed. In the years prior to the transaction: EBITDA was consistently reported above £1bn; Operating profits were strong and stable; Interest costs were modest; Major IT and systems investments were funded centrally. Asda generated meaningful free cashflow and retained the ability to reinvest aggressively when required. Post acquisition, Asda carried approximately £4bn of debt. As interest rates rose, annual interest costs escalated sharply. By 2023–2024: Annual interest expense exceeded £400m; Interest consumed the majority of operating profit; Free cashflow turned structurally negative. In multiple post deal years, Asda generated operating profit yet reported statutory losses after interest.Following separation from Walmart, Asda was required to replace proprietary systems across inventory, forecasting, logistics, and digital platforms. The cost of this transition was approximately £1bn.The rollout was problematic: Forecasting failures; Replenishment breakdowns; Chronic stock shortages; Revenue leakage and customer dissatisfaction.This capex was unavoidable, poorly timed, and layered onto an already leveraged balance sheet. Asda historically competed on value. However: Aldi and Lidl now dominate price leadership and Tesco and Sainsbury’s reinvested heavily in loyalty and data driven pricingAsda became trapped in the middle — unable to undercut discounters or out invest larger incumbents due to balance sheet constraints. Asda did not fail because supermarkets are poor businesses. It struggled because leverage removed strategic optionality at precisely the wrong time.