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Functional Safety Play Book

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7 contributions to Functional Safety Play Book
IPL Management
Hi All, Just read an interesting article on the recent introduction of an ISA standard which provides guidance on the management of Independent Protection Layers - Low Integrity Protection Layers: ANSI/ISA-84.91.03-2025 Explained. This is an interesting subject as IPL's are an essential aspect when working out the target RRF of a SIF, however they are often forgotten about once the plant goes back into operation. Some sites do manage the maintenance of IPL's differently to non-safety loops, via a maintained IPL register, IPL validation and more stringent testing routines. However this is not always the case and a lot of the time IPL's just fall into the normal maintenance system as this article suggests. Would be interesting to hear from the group your thoughts on this subject .....
1 like • May 4
Thank you, very interesting article. Finally, SIF with sil0 will find its application and maintenance.
Burner protection
My proposed topic for discussion: I have experience in conducting a SIL requirement assessments for furnace burning systems. Each client of such analyses have a little bit different approach and risk assessment procedures which I should follow. However as an analyst and session leader I don't agree with them sometimes. It is always a challenge for me, as analyzing such a system raises many questions about the validity of decisions made during the LOPA. Briefly: This particular protection system consists of many instrumented safety functions protecting the furnace, like low and high pressure of the fuel gas, low pressure of combustion air, loss of flame, overpressure in the combustion chamber, wrong air/fuel ratio, CO/O2 flue gas detection, flue gas damper closure detection and some others depending on specific technology used. So the first issue of this SIL analysis is related to the layers of protection. In the most conservative case, we can't take any additional layers of protection independent of the analyzed function. Why? Because all possible other actions are still the same: close the double shutoff valves at the fuel supply line to the burners. The same valves which are part of the SIF we are talking about. What's more it's not always possible to ensure a low personnel presence rate in the hazardous area. This of course results in very high SIL requirements. But I always wonder if this approach is practical and not too conservative? The second question is whether each of these SIFs really needs to be analyzed separately, when most of them protect the furnace from loss of flame and a chamber from the formation of an explosive atmosphere. Perhaps some functions can actually be considered as a one SIF with redundancy and diversification of measurement systems detecting different physical quantities? This case is much closer to my approach of practical side of functional safety. By the way, I've got also a third point of view but maybe I will describe it a little bit later during a discussion.
0 likes • May 4
This is a truly interesting case, and I think every Hazop leader has encountered a furnace burner protection system. I've always considered these SIFs as dependent, as they share common elements and don't pass the independence test.
PVST
Partial Valve Stroke Test. The Exida model (exSILentia) says that partial proof test coverage affects a main proof test coverage factor. I've been using and still following their model for many years. You can find an explanation of this model here: https://www.exida.com/blog/why_does_my_proof_test_coverage_change_with_partial_stroke_testing I'm curious what your approach to this topic is in your PFDavg calculations?
0 likes • May 4
Interesting point of view, thanks for the information.
Hi All - Systems that pre date 61508
Hi all thanks for the add, this looks like a really good way to share experience in the functional safety world. Thanks for setting up Richard. I have a question for you all on the requirements when adding a new SIF to an existing SIL2 system that was designed over 40 years ago and was never designed to 61508. What things would we consider to make this possible without a full system redesign.
1 like • Mar 17
@Tomasz Barnert I just recently completed an audit for an ammonia production facility that has been in existence for over 20 years. HAZOP, LOPA, SRS, and SIL validation were performed. The specialist who performed the SIL confirmation used partial data for some SIF components from analogues, which I think is not correct. However, even using data for analogues, half of the SIF did not confirm the established SIL. I am currently reading the document GN-001_Legacy_Safety_Systems to understand how to properly organize SIL confirmation for older safety systems.
0 likes • Mar 17
@Richard Kelly Yes, of course it is useful) But I realized that with poor documentation of SIS maintenance, and it is almost everywhere bad, it is not possible to confirm compliance with SIL
Mission Time
Hi all, thanks for accepting. First of all, I am new in functional safety and sorry for my bad english😊. Actually I have some doubt about one of variable in PFDavg calculation namely mission time, couple of question to all: 1. What will happen in the end of mission time?should end user decommissioned the plant?or just replace everything and the mission time will get restarted? 2. If it depend on end user, than based on what consideration usually for them to determine the correct mission time?and what is the reason behind that? 3. Since by the time PFDavg will get derated, and SIL claimed may decreased over the time, shouldn't end user decide to set the mission time before the SIL/RRF drops beyond the rating it should be? Hope you guys can share your knowledge. Thanks,
0 likes • Mar 17
It seemed to me that the time of the mission is determined by the manufacturer of a particular component or device.
1 like • Mar 17
@Tomasz Barnert Usually, the manufacturer declares two terms, the first warranty period, and the second service life.
1-7 of 7
Dmitry Kosianchik
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@dmitry-kosianchik-9130
Project Manager (Hazop, Sil, Sil verification)

Active 44d ago
Joined Mar 7, 2026