Category: Erection / Set-Up Interface Risk Incident Overview On a major London project, an incident occurred during crane-related set-up activity where an over-hoist chain became entangled, causing chain and block to fall free. No one was injured, but the drop potential was severe. What Went Wrong Unexpected movement/entanglement occurred mid-task Secondary retention/controls were not sufficient to prevent a drop A “non-lifting moment” became a lifting incident Key Lessons Learned Set-up phases carry lifting-level risks Suspended components require the same controls as live lifts Secondary retention prevents drops when things snag Safety Recommendations Control entanglement hazards, maintain exclusion zones during set-up, and ensure secondary retention where drop risk exists. Incident source Crossrail safety alert on auxiliary jib chain detachment causing chain/block to fall. https://learninglegacy.crossrail.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Health-and-Safety-Alert-140917-Crawler-Crane-Auxiliary-Jib-Chain-Detachment-Update.pdf ●LOLER Reg. 8 – Set-up phases require control. ●PUWER Reg. 11 – Falling object risks must be prevented. ●PUWER Reg. 4 – Equipment must be used safely. ●BS 7121-1 – Set-up activities are lifting operations. Key point Set-up is not “low risk”.

Category: MEWP Failure / Equipment Integrity Incident Overview In March 2025, two workers were seriously injured in Northampton when the platform/deck detached from a large scissor lift during use. The incident triggered investigation and industry safety attention. What Went Wrong Mechanical integrity failed at the interface between deck and arms Pre-use checks did not prevent operation in a dangerous condition Consequences were immediate and severe Key Lessons Learned MEWP failures are sudden and unforgiving “It worked yesterday” is not a check Equipment integrity is a frontline control Safety Recommendations Strengthen MEWP inspection discipline, defect reporting, and isolation rules. If anything feels abnormal (movement, noises, pins, connections), stop and quarantine the machine. Incident source: Industry reporting on Northampton scissor lift platform detachment. https://www.constructionenquirer.com/2025/03/28/deck-falls-off-huge-scissor-lift-at-winvic-site ●LOLER Reg. 4 – Equipment must remain stable and secure. ●PUWER Reg. 5 – Equipment must be maintained. ●PUWER Reg. 6 – Inspections must detect defects. ●PUWER Reg. 11 – Prevent people being struck or crushed. Key point Structural failure gives no warning. Wolf Lifting Dynamics – Safe Lifting UK | Case Study 97

Category: Public Interface / External Hazard Incident Overview In January 2013, a helicopter struck a tower crane jib at St George Wharf, Vauxhall and crashed into the street. The pilot and a pedestrian were killed and others were injured. The investigation highlighted visibility conditions and obstacle awareness. What Went Wrong Crane became a critical public interface hazard External/aviation interface risk exists in dense urban zones Consequences extended far beyond the site boundary Key Lessons Learned Urban cranes create off-site risks Not all hazards are “construction workers” Emergency response planning matters Safety Recommendations Where aviation/river/road interfaces exist, ensure robust hazard awareness measures, emergency plans, and strict control of crane configuration/out-of-service arrangements. Incident source/ Reference AAIB special bulletin on the Vauxhall helicopter crash. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f95ae5274a1317000781/S1-2013_-_Agusta_A109E_G-CRST_03-13.pdf Key point Crane risk does not stop at the fence. Wolf Lifting Dynamics – Safe Lifting UK | Case Study 96

Incident Overview It wasn’t one lift. It wasn’t one person. It was one of those days on a busy construction site where nothing felt right, yet everything carried on as normal. Throughout the shift, several lifting operations took place with clear warning signs: questionable slinging methods, rushed decisions, missing supervision, and loads travelling over active work areas. At multiple points, people noticed that something wasn’t right. Conversations happened. Looks were exchanged. A few comments were made quietly between operatives. But no one stopped the lift. Each time, the assumption was the same: “It’ll be fine.” The crane moved. The load landed. Nothing went wrong — this time. By the end of the day, the site had avoided an incident, but only by luck. The real failure wasn’t technical. It was cultural. What Went Wrong The lifting team relied on experience and familiarity instead of formal control. Although risks were recognised, no one exercised stop-work authority. Responsibility became diluted, and silence replaced leadership. Key Lessons Learned - Recognising risk without acting changes nothing - Silence is still a decision - Luck is not a control measure Safety Recommendations Stop-work authority must be actively encouraged, supported, and expected at all levels. Lifting operations depend on people having the confidence and backing, to intervene when something doesn’t feel right, even if the lift has worked before. •LOLER 1998 Regulation 8 – Organisation of lifting operations Requires lifting operations to be properly planned, appropriately supervised, and carried out in a safe manner. ➜ Failure here was not technical planning, but lack of active supervision and intervention. •PUWER 1998 Regulation 8 – Information and instructions Regulation 9 – Training Workers were able to recognise unsafe conditions, indicating awareness, but training and instructions were not translated into action, highlighting a behavioural gap. •BS 7121-1 Roles, responsibilities and safe systems of work

Modern mobile cranes are not made safe by operator skill alone. They rely on a network of engineered safety systems designed to prevent predictable and repeatable failure modes seen across UK lifting incidents. Understanding what these systems do, why they exist, and when they intervene is a core competency for Appointed Persons, Lift Supervisors, and Crane Operators. Critical Safety Systems & Their Risk-Control Function •Load Moment / Safe Load Indicator (LMI / SLI) This is the crane’s primary overload protection system. It continuously calculates lifting capacity based on live inputs such as load weight, boom length, boom angle, and operating radius. When limits are approached or exceeded, the system provides warnings and progressively restricts crane functions to prevent structural overload or overturning. •Boom Angle & Boom Length Sensors These sensors feed precise positional data into the LMI/SLI system. Any inaccuracy or fault here directly compromises load chart compliance and can create a false sense of available capacity. •Anti-Two Block (A2B) System Designed to prevent the hook block from contacting the boom head. Two-blocking remains a common cause of wire rope failure, boom damage, and dropped loads. The A2B system intervenes before hoist travel becomes destructive. •Wind Speed Indicator (Anemometer) Wind is one of the most underestimated variables in lifting operations. Boom-tip anemometers provide real-time wind data at elevation, allowing lift teams to suspend operations before dynamic load instability occurs. •Hoist Upper Limit Switch Acts as a final physical safeguard against over-hoisting. Failure of this system can result in catastrophic damage to hoist components and loss of load control. •Outrigger Interlocks & Load Sensors These systems confirm full outrigger deployment and monitor ground load distribution. They are fundamental to crane stability and overturning prevention—particularly on marginal ground conditions. •Levelling Systems (Bubble Level / Inclinometer)