Recently, during the debate prep on Thursday, Tim used an objection to things with beginnings needing causes in the property of quantum fields to generate particle-antiparticle pairs seemingly at random with no source. While the obvious response to this is to point out that just because we don't observe the cause doesn't mean there isn't one, and this effect is still contingent on the properties of the fields themselves. However, this led me to think about this effect and how the naturalist would use this process to explain where stuff comes from. A few important notes. 1. Both the Theist and Atheist are following Ockham's Razor, so the theory with the most post hoc assumptions is worse. 2. In physics it is a well-known principle that the source of the vast majority of physical laws comes from symmetries in the universe. 3. One common theory for the Big Bang is that the massive energy condensed into particle anti particle pairs in a process called creation or pair production. 4. The way this process doesn't violate the conservation of energy on normal scales is that the particles and antiparticles annihilate each other. One might ask if these particles always annihilate each other how could the universe come about. The answer is this: In our universe where basically all of the fundamental laws of physics are derived from symmetry we have one absolutely necessary violation of this called CP violation. This causes the decays of Kaons to slightly favor matter to antimatter. The physics itself is not as important as the asymmetry. If the naturalist is to attempt to impose a simple mechanism for the structure of the laws then they would be most reasonable to choose symmetry as this mechanism. To account for this effect they would also need to create an arbitrary limit to this mechanism and establish an asymmetry. This shows that not only are the constants (like the tuning pegs on a guitar) are finely tuned for life and existence, but the underlying structure (the guitar itself) is also finely tuned.

Let’s say a Muslim asks “how many gods died on the cross?” It seems like every obvious answer seems to land you in heresy: Say “one” and it sounds like you’re either claiming the Father suffered (patripassianism) or that there are multiple gods and one of them died (tritheism). Say “zero” and you’ve denied that God truly died for humanity. Say “the Trinity died” and you’ve collapsed the distinction between the persons. The model of Conciliar Trinitarianism dissolves the puzzle through a careful equivocation on the word “God.” Predicatively, “God” works like a descriptor, it applies to anything that exemplifies the divine nature. In this sense, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are each “God,” because each exemplifies the one divinity-attribute. Nominally, “God” works as a proper name, and it refers to one entity alone: the Father, who is the unsourced source of the Son and the Spirit. There is exactly one “God” in this sense. With this distinction in hand, the crucifixion question splits in two: Nominally: zero gods died. The one God, the Father, did not suffer or die. Patripassianism is avoided. Predicatively: one entity that is “God” died. The Son, who genuinely exemplifies divinity, truly died on the cross. The reality of the incarnation and atonement is preserved. Without the equivocation, you’re trapped. Univocal use of “God” forces you to either deny the Son’s death, implicate the Father in suffering, or count multiple gods. The two-sense distinction lets you affirm what orthodoxy requires: the one God (the Father) did not die, and God (the Son, predicatively) genuinely did. This way, monotheism stays intact and the persons stay distinct. Thus, the Christian is not forced to take on unwanted consequences.

In GodLogic’s discussion with Mohammad Hijab, Hijab asked GL this question. And to many people this seemed like a slam dunk on GL. However, this couldn’t be further from the truth. Wanted to do a temperature check on your guys’ intuitions and thoughts here. What do you guys think?

I recently learned about Kants Critique of Pure Reason and I was wondering if his argument indirectly undermines arguments from contingency for Gods existence. Because arguments from contingency require us to conceptualize causality and necessity beyond the bounds of space and time(or beyond experience), doesn’t it follow that we can’t really pull any knowledge from these arguments if we accept Kants framework? I’d be open to any corrections if I misunderstood Kant (probably) or arguments from contingency!

I recently had a thought about the way a lot of naturalists justify their beliefs. Primarily they use physics to explain away all of the issues with naturalism. The implicit appeal here is that since their model is (debatably) coherent then it must be true. Someone like Krauss, Hawking, or Dr. Blitz all make appeals to obscure and post hoc physics models to come to their conclusions to explain the universe without God. This could also be an unspoken use of coherentist justification, but the appeals are about how things are not what we know.