There has been some recent discussion around vindicatory miracles, especially the worry that if another religion has an apparently credible miracle associated with it, Christianity is somehow placed in serious epistemic trouble. I want to offer a framework for thinking about this that I think is both intellectually responsible and, hopefully, helpful for anyone who finds these cases unsettling. The first thing to recognize is this: We do not need to debunk every miracle associated with another religion in order to remain rationally confident in Christianity. In fact, I think Christians can afford to be much more intellectually generous than that. Confirmation is not the same thing as verification. Suppose we encounter some apparently impressive miracle claim associated with Hinduism. Let: - E = the reported miracle - H₁ = Hinduism is true - H₂ = Christianity is true We can now ask a fairly simple question: Is this particular evidence more expected if Hinduism is true than if Christianity is true? In probabilistic terms, we are comparing: P(E | Hinduism) with P(E | Christianity) Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the miracle really would be more expected given Hinduism than given Christianity. Then we should simply admit that. The evidence would, to some degree, favor Hinduism over Christianity. That concession is not remotely the same thing as saying Hinduism is therefore probably true. This is the crucial distinction. Evidence can confirm a hypothesis by raising its probability without making that hypothesis probable overall. Imagine a hypothesis begins with a probability of 1%. New evidence comes along and raises it to 5%. That evidence genuinely supported the hypothesis. Its probability increased fivefold. But it is still only at 5%. So when evaluating a miracle claim, the relevant question is not merely: “Does this evidence support another religion?” It might. The more important question is: “Where does that religion stand once we condition on all of our evidence?”