Right now, I am trying to solidify, or at least improve, my epistemology. And I am currently reading "Skepticism and the Veil of Perception" by Michael Huemer. I'm about 2/3 into the book. Overall, I like his defense of phenomenal conservatism (PC). But there is a point of contention I have: He says on pg. 103 that PC does not imply, "most of the time, when it seems as if P, P is true." But I am failing to see how PC can work without assuming the truth of that claim. If it weren't the case that "most of the time when it seems that P, P is true," why would one be prima facie justified in presuming that P is true? If the seeming that P does not say anything about how probable your belief is of being truth-tracking, then I don't see why the seeming does any justificatory work. After all, isn't the point of seeking justified beliefs to make it more probable that your beliefs are truth-tracking? I would love to hear your thoughts if you have any! Perhaps I am just confused, in which case I would appreciate correction. Appreciate y'all!

Hey community 👋🏽 I’m thinking about starting a Substack and I want your input. For those who don’t know it, Substack is a sleek platform built for writers and bloggers. It’s become the new wave in long-form content: clean, easy to use, and genuinely enjoyable to read on. The idea: post my longer thoughts there regularly so you can actually see how I think in full detail. Stuff that just doesn’t fit on a platform like this. I’ve got a ton of ideas and papers I’ve been sitting on that I haven’t published yet, including: • Arguments for God • Historical apologetics • The problem of evil • High Christology And a lot more you haven’t heard me talk about yet. If this is something you’d want to read, let me know in the comments. If there’s real interest, I’ll seriously consider making the move. Thanks, everyone 🙏🏽​​​​​​​​​​​​

Hey everyone I hope you have all been well and our enjoying this new day we have been given. I’m writing this post because I wanted to ask all of you if you could please pray for my grandfather who is sick and for me because I tore my labrum so that we could both heal. I would really appreciate it and thank you for taking the time to read this and thank you if you ended up taking the time to pray for me and my grandpa. Is there any way I can pray for you? Please let me know I would love to be able to do that!🙏💪🌅

I am about 50 pages into Swinburne's "The Resurrection of God Incarnate." So far, I have really enjoyed it and appreciate his rigor. For the most part, I find much of what he says to be quite plausible. But I have some hesitations regarding his argument from epistemic distance to explain why, if God exists, He is not in constant loving connection with humans. Here are a few of my reflections. Please, feel free to share your thoughts and poke any holes in my thinking (there will likely be many)! I also apologize if it is a bit wordy. Swinburne claims that "epistemic distance" (He cannot make his existence/presence too obvious) is needed so that we do the right things for the right reasons (e.g. we may only act righteously to be thought of well by God, to avoid Hell, to gain a reward like Heaven) and to ensure our freedom (that is, so we are not compelled by God's obvious presence to do good instead of evil). I am not particularly compelled by this argument. Is it really true that God would secure such goods by keeping Himself epistemically distant? Drawing from a parental analogy, I can see some plausibility. If a child is in the presence of a parent or authority figure, perhaps they will behave well merely in virtue of the fact that the authority figure is present. This seems less valuable than if the child behaves well in the absence of the parental figure, simply because the child deems such behavior virtuous. However, I don’t think this is analogous in the case of God. The believer in God, to the extent that they are rationally compelled by the existence of God, will not perceive God as being epistemically distant. Furthermore, they will believe that God is omnipresent. Back to the parental analogy, the believer is like the child, but wherever the child goes, they believe the parent is inevitably present. If Swinburne is correct, then it seems like the goods gained by God's epistemic distance are not secured, at least for believers in God. Would this imply that believers are being robbed of their freedom and being compelled by God's existence to do good, that believers' motives for their actions are, in a sense, corrupted by their belief in God? I am not entirely sure, actually, but there seems to be some tension here.

Hey all! Here's a sneak peak at a thumbnail I created for a brand new video. In this upcoming video, I showcase a bit of what it looks like to engage in group calls. For this one, we role played handling problem of evil objections. Hoping to have this one out by tonight 🔥