@Niko Gulić My research in a few forthcoming peer-reviewed philosophy papers (and likely my thesis) deal with this idea regarding the underdetermination of miracles. First thing to understand is that Jesus’ Resurrection is what philosophy of language experts in pragmatics call a “signal.” While the actual raw data (the resurrection) doesn’t logically entail the sender type, the surrounding context - the coordination, the semantic content in-near proximity, the ex-ante passion predictions of resurrection - show that the resurrection functions as an endorsement of Jesus’ identity. While it doesn’t prove that the Christian God resurrected Jesus, it minimally shows that the resurrection + context is a communicative signal meant to be interpreted as a vindication of the Christian God. But why might someone want to endorse the Christian God? It doesn’t mean that it’s ACTUALLY the Christian God, you may ask. There are a few things going on in your “spiritual example” and your “unknown natural law.” A force (or agent with genetic aims) that raised Christ from the dead without endorsing his claims has a smaller explanatory scope with respect to Jesus’ communicative acts. It’s like saying “quantum fluctuations explain the resurrection” or that “physics explains consciousness.” It’s a nice hypothetical, but the precise details are needed to generate that explanatory power (ex. the exact arrangement of the atoms to produce resurrection are needed because the possibility space of non-anthropological continuums rarely account for counterfactuals. It only takes one stray atom to not result in a resurrection). Similarly, Shakespeare is best explained by an agent, not “physical laws mashing together.” So the better explanation is a personal agent ratifying Jesus’ claims, but what principled reason should we think that the Christian God is the better explanation vs. deceptive aliens or gods? My good friend Roy from ImagoLogos helped me with an analogy that will stick. If you recall, the Cartesian Demon can deceive you into thinking your experiences of the universe are real. So if sensory experience is probability-raising support for BOTH the Cartesian Demon (or even “deceptive natural law) and ordinary reality, does this mean that we should be global skeptics?