This milestone is a reflection of years (2006 start) of dedication, resilience, and hands-on experience in Canada’s energy sector. Over the most recent several years, I’ve had the privilege to contribute to some dynamic projects, including: 🔹 Assistant Shift Engineer – Keyera Simonette Gas Plant Operating in a high-capacity midstream facility (450 MMcf/d sour gas & 27,000 bbl/d condensate), with responsibility for cryogenic and sour gas processing, amine & dehydration units, fractionation, compressors, and SCADA/DCS monitoring. Supporting safe operations, hazard mitigation, and contractor onboarding while optimizing plant performance. 🔹 Process Foreman – Sancon Commissioning (Pembina Brownfield Upgrade) Leading commissioning and startup activities, mechanical isolations, permit-to-work processes, lockout/tagout procedures, and SOP development. Ensuring safe turnover of systems and alignment with client standards during critical project phases. 🔹 Contract Operator – S2F Global Resources Supporting Strathcona’s HIP VAP R&D pilot for SAGD steam generation using produced water (GHG reduction & water treatment innovation). Additionally, operating AltaGas’ Townsend deepcut, shallow cut, and mercaptan plant (550 MMscf/d) with responsibility for isolations, inspections, and emergency readiness. These experiences have deepened my industry service commitments and further shaped me into a safety-first, technically versatile operator who thrives on collaboration, problem-solving, and continual learning. Looking ahead, I am already actively pursuing my 2nd Class certification with study materials in hand and initial program underway in the Power Engineering 101 modules. This certification is not the finish line; it’s a steppingstone toward continued professional growth and contribution to Western Canada's power and natural gas industry.

After finally getting the 2nd A1/2/3 exams completed, I’m chomping at the bit to get the three remaining ones out of the way here. I’m probably going to start with 2B2. However anyone that’s written recently, any feedback on these ones? I’ve been going over the syllabus and after speaking with co-workers they didn’t think they’re anywhere near as difficult as the first three. I know there’s probably some posts in here, but I don’t really have a lot of patience to go back and look at old posts. Thanks everyone!

In operations, the facts and outcomes may be the same in any organization — but the culture you foster determines whether those outcomes are sustained, improved, or repeated. Mindsets That Shape Culture 🔴 Culture of Blame - People are the problem - Fault-finding & finger-pointing - Mistakes hidden out of fear - Focus on the past and punishment - Risk-averse, “wait until told” behaviour 🟢 Culture of Accountability - People are problem-solvers - Fact-finding to understand what happened - Mistakes surfaced for learning - Focus on the future and solutions - Calculated risk-taking and initiative ☆Examples in Power Engineering - Reporting a process variable setpoint error instead of silently adjusting around it. - Leaving a control loop in manual after start-up and forgetting to return it to auto — not hidden, but reviewed and corrected so it doesn’t repeat. - Suppressing an alarm rather than addressing the root rationalization issue — which can delay response to an upset or optimization opportunity. ☆Each of these moments can become either a learning opportunity or a blame trap. The difference? Culture. ☆Why This Matters Our regulatory frameworks (e.g., ABSA Safety Codes Act, OH&S Code, CSA standards, AER directives) all hinge on one thing: human behaviour in real time. ☆If the environment encourages hiding or deflecting, risks multiply. If the environment supports reporting, reflection, and coaching, hazards are contained and systems optimized. ☆A Note on Stigma Men and women may experience the risk of speaking up differently. - Men often face stigma around vulnerability, “not knowing,” or admitting error. - Women often face stigma around being “too assertive” or “overcautious.” Both stigmas are dangerous in high-consequence environments. Leaders must dismantle these barriers so that every operator feels safe to voice a concern or admit an oversight. Accountability Framework (Post-Investigation) 1️⃣ Exceptional Behaviour → Recognize & reward.

Thank you to everyone who took part in our Community Celebration Event. We’re incredibly grateful for each and every one of you who continues to contribute, support, and grow this Power Engineering community. As part of the celebration, we held three swag prize draws—and we’re excited to announce the winners: 1. @Amanjot Singh 2. @Daniel Batarseh 3. @Sean Mclaughlin Congratulations to all three of you! We’ll be reaching out directly to arrange delivery of your swag. To everyone else—thank you for being here. This community wouldn’t be what it is without your questions, input, and commitment to supporting one another. We’re looking forward to continuing to grow and help even more Power Engineers reach their goals. Stay connected. Keep learning. And thank you for being part of the journey.

If you’ve ever worked in a plant, you know there are moments where someone says: “Let’s just bypass this to get through the job, it’ll be fine.” But here’s the thing… regulations, design intent, and real-world incidents all say otherwise. What ABSA and PESR Say In Alberta, ABSA’s AB-528 User Guide makes it crystal clear: “Safety control functions shall be installed in such a way as to prevent a bypass.” The Pressure Equipment Safety Regulation (PESR) goes further in Section 39, requiring that relief and overpressure protection systems remain sealed after maintenance, and that any change requires Safety Codes Officer approval. This isn’t just bureaucratic red tape, it’s about preserving Independent Protection Layers (IPLs), which are often the only barriers between a process upset and a serious incident. What Counts as a Safety Control? According to ABSA, safety controls include instrumented and non-instrumented functions, like: - Shutdown & blowdown valves - Level, pressure, flow, or temperature safety trips - Burner management systems - Fire & gas detectors - Pressure safety valves, rupture disks, overspeed trips - HVAC pressurization in control rooms (Full list in ABSA Appendix A.) Bypassing any of these removes a critical safeguard. Global Industry Parallels In U.S. offshore operations, regulators (BSEE) allow temporary bypass only with strict controls: - Visual indication of the bypass - Continuous monitoring - Written, time-bound approvals Even then, it’s treated as an exception, not a shortcut. The Real Question for Operators We’ve all seen it done, but the real measure of safety culture is how we manage it: ✅ Do you have a formal bypass permit process? ✅ Are bypasses tracked, tagged, and alarmed? ✅ Is there a clear plan for restoration, and is it verified? ✅ Do you know which alarms or trips are absolute “never bypass” territory? 💬 Your Turn - Have you been part of a bypass management or rationalization process? - What worked, what didn’t, and what would you never skip? - How do you train new operators on the seriousness of bypassing safeguards?